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I. Introduction
{1} Concern about privacy on the Internet runs high, but the prescriptions for treatment vary widely. Privacy
advocates seek different goals when formulating policy proposals. Some seek to protect individuals and
society from the effects of loss of privacy, including the loss of human dignity. Others seek to encourage the
development of online markets in personal information, so that consumers can profit from their own
information, rather than giving it away. Still, others seek primarily to promote the growth of e-commerce, and
see privacy fears as a threat to that goal. These goals are fundamentally inconsistent, and that inconsistency is
obscured by the fact that much of the current debate about online privacy focuses on the tools of regulation,
rather than the goals for which regulation is sought.
{2} Part I of this article will briefly survey the current concern over online privacy, why it is considered
important, and how it is threatened. Part II will identify three distinct perspectives in current thinking about
Internet privacy, which will be defined as the "dossier society pessimists", the "market opportunists", and the
"privacy peacemakers". Part III reviews current policy initiatives regarding online privacy to see which of the
schools of thought identified above predominates in the public policy debate. That section concludes that
such initiatives generally fall into the "privacy peacemaker" camp, aiming to control the worst and most
visible abuses of privacy, so as to avoid impairing the growth of e-commerce. Current initiatives are not
aimed at promoting the goals of the market opportunists, who hope to see markets in personal information
develop online; nor are they aimed at averting or reversing the advent of dossier society so feared by the
dossier society pessimists.
 
II. Threats to Privacy Online
A. Public concern over online privacy
{3} From the perspective of many policymakers, the perception that privacy is at risk online is as important
as the reality. Public opinion polling data are frequently cited to support the need for privacy regulation.[1]
One of the most frequently-cited surveys is an Equifax/Harris poll reported in the March 1998 issue of
Business Week, which indicated that two-thirds (2/3) of non-Internet users said they would be more likely to
begin using the Internet if their privacy were assured.[2] Non-users cited privacy as the most important
reason for staying off the Internet -- more important than cost or technical complexity.[3] Of those using the
Internet, seventy-eight (78) percent said they would use it more if their privacy were guaranteed.[4]
{4} Not only do the polling data indicate that individuals view privacy as a fundamental value, they also
highlight the concern among Internet promoters that privacy fears may slow the public's acceptance of e-
commerce, which is an important practical reason for the government to address those concerns.[5]
{5} While the majority of commentators accept the polling data at face value, a dissenting position also
exists. The dissenters point out that techniques for protecting online privacy have existed for years, but are
not well utilized. Anonymizer services have been available for some time that mask the identity of online
users, for a nominal cost. Most users do not take advantage of them;[6] however, either because of the
perceived technical complexity of using them, the price, or the mere fact that users do not care as much about
privacy as advocates contend.[7] In addition, polling questions which simply ask "do you care about privacy
online" are bound to generate more positive responses than surveys that ask respondents to rank privacy in
importance, compared with other public and private issues.[8] Regardless of these observations, however, the
perceived wisdom of policymakers continues to be that privacy is an important value to Americans which
must be safeguarded if e-commerce is to achieve its full potential.[9]
B. Nature of the Threat
{6} The Internet raises new threats to privacy, and enhances old threats as a result of the increased data
processing capability of computers combined with the data gathering and dissemination potential of the
Internet itself. As the Federal Trade Commission staff noted in a 1998 report on one of its privacy workshops:
Globalization and new technologies are radically changing the contours of the late Twentieth
Century marketplace. In the 1980's, the personal computer revolution enhanced the ability of
government, industry and consumers to capture a vast array of personal information
automatically. In the 1990's, the technology underlying the Internet is making it even easier and
less expensive to gather, store, analyze, transmit and reuse personal information in ways that
were unimaginable just a few years ago.[10]
{7} Personal data, such as address, phone number, income, property value, and marital status have always
been available to those willing to dig.[11] The Internet can make it possible for a much wider class of persons
-- essentially all Internet users -- to gain access to similar types of personal information at little or no cost.
{8} "Profiling" is the term used to denote the gathering, assembling, and collating of data about individuals in
databases which can be used to identify, segregate, categorize and generally make decisions about individuals
known to the decisionmaker only through their computerized profile.[12]
{9} There is a perception that such activities conducted online pose a greater threat to privacy than similar
activities in the off-line world. Data obtained and recorded in digital form can be preserved indefinitely, and
the perception that a permanent record of our movements and actions is recorded and available to posterity is
oppressive to many.[13]
{10} The first step in the process of data gathering can be either overt or covert. It is this stage that receives
the most attention in connection with policymaking, in part, because it is the stage of which users are most
aware. In addition, data gathering may be the stage of the process most amenable to regulation, since it may
be the only stage of the process in which the data subject is directly involved and can therefore assert (or
meaningfully waive) his rights. Internet users voluntarily disclose a great deal of information about
themselves through registration pages, user surveys, online contests, application forms, and transaction
documents.[14] Information disclosures may be required as a condition of participating in an online chat
room or bulletin board.[15]
{11} In its 1998 survey of online privacy practices, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") found that
ninety-two percent (92%) of the 1,402 websites surveyed collected some personal data. The most popular
items of data were name, e-mail address, postal address and phone number.[16] The FTC found that websites
soliciting personal information usually did not contain any posted privacy policy. Only fourteen percent
(14%) of websites had any sort of privacy disclosure, and only a single site was found to meet all the criteria
of notice, access, security and third-party disclosure identified by the FTC as critical.[17]
{12} Nervousness about solicitation of personal information online may be enhanced by the fact that, unlike
brick and mortar businesses that present a "face" to the real world and may have an incentive to maintain a
favorable reputation in the community, webpages appear as purely electronic fronts. The user has only a
limited ability to peer behind the front to determine who, if anyone, stands behind the behavior of the page
sponsor. Indeed, users may not even know the identity of the entity to which they are giving their personal
information.[18]
{13} On the other hand, the interactive nature of Internet communications may foster a greater level of trust
in some users, particularly children or the unsophisticated. As the FTC staff noted after a workshop on
childrens' privacy:
[T]he unique qualities of the Internet make it a particularly intrusive medium for children. The
medium capitalizes on 'one to one marketing' and permits the site to develop a personal
relationship with the user. For example, with more detailed collection of data on a child, future e-
mail solicitations may come from an animated character appearing on the child's screen,
addressing him by name and urging him to purchase a specific product -- perhaps a product over
which the child lingered the last time he visited the site. The safeguards of traditional broadcast
media, which bar 'host selling' and require separation between program, editorial and advertising,
do not currently exist online.[19]
{14}Websites can also extract information that users do not voluntarily provide, such as the user's e-mail
address, the type of browser, the type of computer being used, and the Internet address (URL) from which the
user linked to the current site.[20] Websites can identify repeat users through the use of "cookies", which are
small programs inserted onto the user's hard drive by the webpage which are accessed when the user revisits
the page at a later date.[21] Websites can track the "clickstream" of the user, recording the portions of the
page visited, and individual clicks made within each page.[22] This data can be recorded, stored, aggregated,
and analyzed as evidence of consumer preferences by the webpage sponsor.[23]
{15} Recently, attention has focused on hardware and software systems that can assign a unique identification
number to each personal computer, and the risk posed by such systems that webpages will be able to identify
and track individual users. Controversy erupted in February 1999 over the disclosure that Intel's Pentium III
chip contained unique numerical identifiers.[24] Similar controversy arose over the discovery that Microsoft
software contains a "Registration Wizard," which assigns a unique identifier to each PC on which Microsoft
software is loaded.[25]
{16} The most frequent use of data obtained from non-governmental websites online is marketing.[26]
Website sponsors use data about their own visitors to learn which aspects of their page, or the goods and
services offered on it, users are drawn to most. Such data may be useful even if collected only in aggregate
form. In addition, data tied to the identity of individual users allow the page sponsor to program the page to
display custom tailored product and service options, as well as advertising, when the user next visits the page.
Individual preference data tied to individual name, address, phone or email address information may be sold
to direct marketers or others for use in marketing goods and services bearing no relation to the subject matter
of the page or transaction through which the information was originally obtained. 
  
 
III. The Current State of Privacy Regulation
{17} The response to the above-described threats to privacy has been varied. As usual, where some see risk
others see opportunity. However, most commentators appear to agree that existing law provides little
protection for personal data online.
A. The tort of invasion of privacy
{18} The common law tort of invasion of privacy does not provide significant protection in the off-line
world,[27] let alone the new online environment. The reasons for this are many, having to do with the
intellectual history of the tort and its antagonistic posture versus the First Amendment and press defendants.
[28]
1. Inadequate scope of the common law torts of invasion of privacy
{19} The tort of invasion of privacy had its origins in the seminal article by Warren and Brandeis in 1890,
entitled The Right to Privacy, in which the authors argued for recognition of the tort we would today call
"public disclosure of private facts."[29] Through subsequent common law development and legislation, the
tort of invasion of privacy became widely established. In 1960, Dean Prosser surveyed seventy years of
experience with the tort and declared that, rather than a single tort, there were really four separate and quite
distinct torts masquerading as a single right to privacy: (1) the tort of appropriation of one's name or likeness
for the commercial benefit of another, as where a person's picture is used in an advertisement without
permission; (2) public disclosure of private facts, the tort first championed by Warren and Brandeis and
directed squarely at disclosure of personal facts in the tabloid press; (3) the tort of intrusion into seclusion,
which has been described as a lesser form of trespass; and (4) "false light", which protects against the public
use of one's name or image in a way that imputes to the subject views the subject does not hold or otherwise
inaccurate circumstances.[30] Prosser's four part reductionist analysis of the tort proved persuasive and was
codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which he was the reporter.[31] Innumerable law reviews
have been written about the origin and nature of the four privacy torts. The important fact for the present
discussion is that the four common law torts are generally considered to be irrelevant when it comes to online
privacy issues, although a few commentators have argued for expansion of common law rights as a partial
solution to online privacy threats.[32]
{20} False light can be rejected immediately as a solution to online primary concerns because it requires
some element of falsity.[33] The predominant concern with respect to online privacy is that too much truth
will be obtained and disseminated about us; a rule that only bars publication of false information is a non-
starter. The tort of intrusion into solitude would appear to be inapplicable online because it requires, as the
name implies, an "unreasonable and offensive intrusion into the seclusion of another."[34] Much of the
personal data obtained online is provided voluntarily by users, and, in any event, no consensus has emerged
that time spent on the Internet constitutes time in "seclusion," except perhaps in seclusion from family
members and others in the real world who occupy the same residence as the online user.
{21} The tort of public disclosure of private facts would appear to fail for the same reason. To be actionable,
there must be a disclosure of facts that are private.[35] Plaintiffs repeatedly lose such cases upon a showing
that the fact in question was already in the public domain where, for example, it was obtained from a public
record or other source outside the plaintiff's control, or obtained from plaintiff directly while in a public
place.[36] Facts obtained from an online user may not be considered private when voluntarily provided by
the user to a "stranger" webpage, or when gleaned from observation of online behavior while visiting the
webpage. Moreover, public disclosure of private facts hinges on the embarrassment that accompanies
publication of private facts to a wide audience.[37] Online privacy concerns regarding profiling are unrelated
to the wide distribution of the personal information. The fact that a marketing firm obtains personal
information, and uses or sells it to a limited number of third parties, generally does not involve the same kind
of embarrassment because the data remains invisible to the data subject as well as the public at large.[38]
{22} The tort of appropriation also has little apparent application online.[39] What is appropriated from
online users is their personal information, which has value in a marketing context. Online information is not
used to sell products to others by associating the subject with the product in a testimonial manner or by use of
the subject's face on the product packaging. Instead, the information is used to make decisions about how to
market products or services to the subject himself. While information about the subject is certainly
"appropriated" online, it is not the kind of information, or the kind of appropriation, that has traditionally
been the subject of the appropriation tort.
{23} On a more general level, the common law privacy torts fail to protect online privacy because they do
not protect actions taken in public,[40] and the Internet is arguably a public environment. The torts protect
only private facts, whereas, a great deal of online privacy concern focuses on information that is "personal,"
without really being "private" -- name, address, phone number, e-mail address, and information regarding our
conduct in the presence of, or in transactions with, strangers. Finally, the common law privacy torts are aimed
at protecting against egregious conduct which causes a socially unacceptable level of shame or humiliation, a
level of protection far more limited than what most consumers seem to want online.
B. Limitations on the current "sectoral" approach to privacy regulation in the United States
{24} Legislative protection of privacy in the United States is sometimes charitably referred to as "sectoral",
meaning that legislation is directed in piecemeal fashion toward specific industries or issues, rather than
constituting a global privacy policy for the nation as a whole.[41] Apologists for the American system stress
the flexibility of this form of regulation, its ability to tailor regulation closely to the needs of individual
situations, and its tendency to avoid the sins of overregulation which might accompany a more
comprehensive, "one-size-fits-all" regulatory scheme.[42] Less charitably, the current U.S. regulatory scheme
could be referred to as a disorganized patchwork thrown up in response to individual, highly-publicized
instances of abuse, but leaving certain important areas of privacy underprotected.[43]
{25} Regulation of personal data privacy can be found in a handful of separate federal statutes.[44] Specific
statutes protect privacy interests in video rental records,[45] student loan information,[46] and drivers license
information.[47] The Fair Credit Reporting Act[48] regulates the conduct of credit reporting agencies. Other
statutes specifically limit the ability of the government to disclose personal information about individuals.[49]
In addition, several federal statutes protect electronic communications from disclosure.[50]
{26} While no federal agency has general authority to regulate online privacy, unfair and deceptive practices
with respect to privacy -- such as posting a privacy policy and then violating it -- may give rise to FTC
enforcement action.[51] 
  
 
IV. Critiques of Privacy Policy
{27} Commentators, legislators and regulators viewing the online privacy landscape and asking the question,
"where do we go from here?" arrive at dramatically different answers. The conflicting points of view can be
categorized and contrasted in various ways. For this article, I have divided them into three "camps" which I
have labeled the "dossier society pessimists", the "market opportunists", and the "privacy peacemakers".[52]
A. The dossier society pessimists
1. What is the dossier society?
{28} The phrase "dossier society" conjures up the image of a society in which every detail of life is recorded
and preserved in a central filing system accessible to those with power over their fellow citizens. Concerns
about the dossier society certainly pre-date the advent of the computer, especially with respect to surveillance
by totalitarian and repressive governments.[53] In 1971, Arthur Miller found that establishment of a dossier
society was well under way in America, stating that, "the dossier society's genesis dates back several decades
to the federal government's entry into the taxation and social welfare spheres."[54] Miller cited as examples,
the federal census and the government's involvement in defense, housing, welfare, and jobs programs, all of
which gather and use tremendous amounts of data about individuals in the course of administering various
programs. But, with the increasing use of the credit card and the mainframe computer in the 1960's, the
critical commentary came to focus increasingly on the abuses that were possible in the private sphere.[55]
Numerous popular and academic accounts predicted a dramatic impact on individuals and society from the
combination of increased information gathering, data storage capacity, computation abilities, and
communicative capabilities of digital computers.[56]
{29} The concerns of dossier society critics are summed up by Professor Vern Countryman in his 1971
article:
The computer has further facilitated the quest for efficiency. With its endless
capacity to store data and to regurgitate it with lightning-like speed, it is inefficient
not to use the computer to combine the various dossiers compiled on each
individual. If the present trend continues, the day will come when the push of a
button will produce a complete 'data profile' on each citizen, from his departure from
the womb (or perhaps sometime earlier) to some time after he enters his tomb.[57]
2. Concerns about Accuracy, Discrimination and Human Dignity
{30} More specifically, "dossier society" concerns can be discussed under three separate headings: accuracy,
discrimination, and human dignity. Unfairness results when decisions are made based on inaccurate data.
Inaccuracies can arise in personal information databases when data becomes outdated or stale, or when data
is improperly entered in the first instance. In addition, errors or distortions in reading and interpreting data are
likely when data is collected (accurately) for one purpose, but is then transferred to another entity for use in
answering questions not directly related to the reasons the data was collected in the first instance.
{31} Statistically-generated profiles may mask old-fashioned race prejudice or other illicit biases which are
explicitly ruled out of order on grounds of public policy.[58] On a more subtle level, a form of bias may be
inherent in the way computers think. The use of computer matching to answer questions about an individual
frequently involves an exercise in sorting, matching, and averaging that individual's traits compared with
others -- what we in human terms, would call stereotyping. There is something offensive to our notion of
individualism when we are judged solely based on the average characteristics of the various classes to which
we may be assigned membership, even if there is nothing "suspect" about the classes themselves.[59]
{32} This concern with discrimination is also related to a general concern with the impact that constant
monitoring and judging of human behavior have on "human dignity."[60] Critics view the recording of daily
events, purchases, communications, and inquiries as a form of surveillance. Data gathering and maintenance
through the Internet arguably more resembles surveillance than casual observation in public. Unlike a casual
glance in a public space, the "view" of an online observer with respect to online behavior is crisp and clear,
since one-hundred percent of online behavior can be captured, and it is unforgettable, since data recorded
digitally can be preserved in perpetuity at minimal cost.[61]
{33} One effect of surveillance is to promote law-abiding behavior, and surveillance (more innocuously
termed "monitoring") is useful for both education and training, as well as punishment.[62] However, the fear
is that constant surveillance inevitably induces caution and self-censorship. Surveillance discourages not only
illegal or immoral behavior, but originality, spontaneity, and risk taking in general.[63] Advocates of strong
privacy protection maintain that room to experiment and to make mistakes is essential to human growth and a
feeling of freedom. There is also a perception that being observed without consent is a form of violation, as
reflected in laws regarding wiretapping, eavesdropping, and "peeping Toms."[64]
{34} From a political perspective, the concern is that online digital surveillance will tend to limit dissent and
the expression of unpopular opinion.[65] This insight is reflected in cases upholding the right to participate in
political activities on an anonymous basis.[66] Even without the assumption that Internet surveillance will be
used directly to expose dissenters to public opprobrium, constant monitoring may be harmful to the social
fabric in more subtle ways. Preservation of free, unmonitored individual space may be essential to
maintenance of a society based on the value of individualism. As a result, the loss of privacy may be harmful
not only to the sensitive individuals who feel aggrieved by its loss. It may also constitute a harm to society
itself,[67] even if individual members of that society do not mind the loss, and willingly give up their privacy
or trade it away for financial or other consideration. The logical consequence of this viewpoint is that society
itself has an interest in preventing individuals from exposing themselves to too much loss of privacy.
3. Policy initiatives related to acceptance of the dossier society critique
{35} As a working hypothesis, we can consider public policy pronouncements to embody elements that the
dossier society critique if they include certain identifiable features. One such feature would be outright limits
on alienability of data, designed to protect individuals and society as a whole from the debilitating effects of
the dossier society, despite the pressure posed by technology, commercial markets in information, or just
plain citizen apathy.
{36} A second feature would be limitations on the use of personal information databases and data-matching
programs to make decisions about individual rights or opportunities.[68] Such measures would reflect the
concern with discrimination inherent in such programming.
{37} Third, proposals motivated by dossier society concerns might be expected to place limits on the sheer
quantity of data collected or stored. Such limits would include requirements that data be destroyed after a
certain period of time, or prohibitions on collecting certain types of data even at all.[69]
{38} Finally, such prophylactic measures would not limit themselves to regulation at the point of data
collection, but would extend to data obtained from public records and to other third party sources.
B. The Privacy Market Opportunists
{39} By the label "privacy market opportunist", I mean to describe those who promote the development of
markets in personal data.[70] Privacy market opportunists begin with the assumption that, even though
privacy may be a "fundamental human right," that does not mean that individuals should not have the ability
to decide for themselves how much that right is worth to them personally, and whether to sell, trade or give
away their private information in their own self-interest.[71]
{40} As a result, the market opportunist analysis does not focus on the importance of privacy or the role it
plays in the lives of individuals or society. Instead, it focuses on describing the theoretical benefits and
limitations of free and active markets in private information, identifying obstacles to creation of such
markets, and proposing policy measures designed to foster development of such markets.[72] The goal is to
let consumers share in the value of their own personal information.[73]
1. Benefits of a market in personal information
{41} Market opportunists observe that the current state of the law results in personal data being too cheaply
valued and therefore, overutilized.[74] However, there is also the general recognition that, absent some
change in the existing law or technology, efficient markets in personal data are unlikely to emerge any time
soon.[75] In short, the current "crisis" in privacy, which results in so much commentary and attention in legal
and regulatory circles, is not merely a result of technological changes that make increased surveillance
possible; it is also the result of market failures due to poor social choice in the allocation of property rights in
information.[76]
{42} Under the existing United States privacy regime, personal data is the property of the person or entity
who captures and organizes it.[77] Those favoring the development of markets in personal data reject the
assumption that data appropriators necessarily own such data merely because they collected it through their
webpage and compiled it into a useful format.[78] Instead, the determination of how to allocation property
rights in data must be made based upon an evaluation of the relative amount of information and power in the
hands of the parties to the transaction, and the social goals (efficiency usually predominant among them) to
be achieved by allowing such trades.[79]
{43} Some commentators have speculated as to what markets in personal data might look like. One vision is
of individual consumers entering into transactions online with individual websites, in which requests for
information, either overt or surreptitious, prompt the consumer to demand a quid pro quo in the form of either
money, or more likely, a credit for additional online goods and services which would otherwise not be free.
Others see consumers using intermediaries as information brokers to bundle up the information provided by a
"tranch" of 1,000 or more similarly-situated individuals, and to market that information to commercial
buyers. Royalties on such sales would be returned to the data subjects in some form, minus a profit for the
broker.[80]
{44} It is apparent that in some ways, the Internet is the ideal environment for envisioning the development
of markets in personal information. Contract terms can be offered, and consent registered and documented
very efficiently online. The personal data itself can be transferred from the subject to the commercial entity
online (again, whether overtly or covertly), and the consideration for the trade can flow back to the data
subject online as well, in the form of credits for online services.
{45} There is some indication that this world is already upon us. Companies called infomediaries are already
springing up to market individual data, and others are offering goods and services online in exchange for
personal information.[81] Consumers are already willing to pay for privacy in other areas of their lives, and
may be more than willing to enter into privacy transactions online.[82]
2. Obstacles to the creation of markets in personal information
{46} Enthusiasm for markets in individual information is tempered by the practical difficulties accompanying
any attempt to set up such markets. First, a great deal of information about individuals is already in the public
domain, including information from public and semi-public sources. That information will compete with any
information an individual attempts to sell about himself.[83] Second, once an individual sells his information,
control of that information is lost. Even if the terms of the contract of sale or license prohibit retransmission
to third parties or reuse for purposes not agreed upon, such terms would be very difficult to enforce.
Punishment of cheaters and leakers will be difficult and rare. As a result, some admit that exactly how a
market in privacy would actually work in practice is only dimly understood at this point.[84]
{47} Moreover, asymmetries in information and bargaining power may result in built-in advantages for
commercial information appropriators, as compared with individual data subjects. The buyer will usually
know more about the anticipated use of the information than the seller. A consumer may face relatively high
costs in the form of money, time and inconvenience by turning down an online transaction merely because it
would entail certain information disclosures; whereas, to the merchant, one individual's potential transaction
may be far too insignificant to make it worth bargaining over privacy rights on an individual basis.[85] On
the other hand, the attempt to establish a market in personal information, combined with recognized property
rights in such data, may require creation a legal and enforcement system with an unacceptably high level of
expense and complexity.[86]
{48} In light of the above concerns, one may wonder whether any markets in individual information are
likely to develop. This author tends to think such markets will develop simply because the consumer is
always in possession of at least one key piece of information that is unavailable from public sources, and as
such, because it changes daily, is always fresh and valuable for sale. That information consists of the
consumer's own subjective interest in being marketed a given product, service, or subject matter. An
individual who wakes up one morning with the desire to buy a new car or a set of golf clubs has something
valuable to sell in the form of his own subjective state of mind. This information has a short shelf life and
may not be available to marketers through any source other than the consumer himself.
3. Policy initiatives of the market opportunists
{49} The first principle for any market opportunist, of course, must be that the law should allow transactions
in personal information to occur. They would oppose inalienability rules preventing individuals from
determining whether to sell information about themselves or how much to charge for that information.[87]
{50} In general, proponents of markets in personal data would encourage government action intended to
equalize information among participants in data transactions by requiring websites to post privacy policies,
disclose the use being made of information gathered online, and otherwise ensure that consumer consent is
meaningful when obtained.[88] Proponents of markets in personal information suggest modifying the
"default rule" as one way to equalize information.[89] The present default rule is that, absent explicit
agreement to the contrary, the webpage sponsor is presumed to be the owner of any information obtained on
the page. A contrary default rule could be imposed as a matter of law; however, under which the use of
personal information for purposes beyond the transaction in which it was provided would be barred, absent
affirmative consent. A modified form of the present rule would be an "opt out" rule, under which consumers
would have the right to remove their name from mailing lists or otherwise retrieve their personal information
by taking affirmative steps. The contrary rule would be an "opt in" rule.
{51} An "opt in" rule can be seen as transaction forcing and market promoting. By requiring the webpage
sponsor to bring the issue to the data subject's attention in an explicit manner and to seek affirmative consent,
it is much more likely that consent will not be granted absent a transaction involving consideration flowing to
the data subject. Under the present system data subjects give their data away not realizing they are even
parting with something of potential value.
{52} Not everyone who examines the issue concludes that an "opt in" rule is warranted. Such a rule may be
inefficient if it discourages too many individuals from participating, and, as a result, the total data pool
becomes less valuable for everyone.[90] In general, however, we would consider transaction forcing "opt in"
rules to be the hallmarks of the privacy market opportunist.
{53} Consistent with the above proposals, privacy market opportunists might also support initiatives to
clarify a data subject's property rights in personal data obtained from all sources, including third parties, not
just from the subject himself.[91] Establishment of such rights would be onerous to data appropriators, and
would pose a much higher burden on the commercial use of personal data because it would require the
appropriator to affirmatively contact data subjects with which he has no other relationship in order to obtain
permission for the use of their data.[92]
{54} Finally, one of the principal difficulties in maintaining a fair market in privacy is the difficulty private
citizens would face in policing adherence to stated privacy policies, or the terms of any transaction allowing
only limited use of specific personal data.[93] Privacy market opportunists should be expected to support
measures to bring government enforcement to bear on Internet sites that abuse information by using it beyond
the scope of any license agreed to in the transaction.
C. The Privacy Peacemakers
1. Concern over promoting online commerce
{55} The third orientation discussed here is referred to as the "privacy peacemaker". This perspective focuses
not on protecting society from the debilitating effects of loss of privacy, nor promoting a transfer of
ownership rights in personal data from appropriators to data subjects, forcing markets in such information to
develop. Instead, the main concern of the "privacy peacemakers" is to ensure that privacy fears -- well
founded or otherwise -- do not impede the continued growth on online commerce.
{56} The idea that privacy concerns must be dealt with in order for the Internet to achieve its full potential is
stated explicitly in the pronouncements of numerous government organizations proposing online privacy
guidelines.[94] Such concerns are also cited by private sector commentators interested in promoting
development of the Internet.[95] Such statements are frequently accompanied by citations to public opinion
polling data, as cited in Section I, evidencing a high level of public concern about the issue.[96]
{57} A related argument expresses the fear that unless privacy is dealt with through industry self-regulation,
the public will demand imposition of heavy-handed government regulation,which will hamper the
development of the Internet.[97] The main point, however, is that "privacy peacemakers" measure any
proposed privacy protection scheme as much by what it does not accomplish (impairing the growth of the
Internet), as by what it does accomplish. In seeking an accommodation of privacy concerns while making the
minimum imposition on business, "privacy peacemakers" frequently use the rhetoric of "balancing." The
desire of online users for privacy must be balanced against the American tradition of free transfer of
information, the First Amendment, and the legitimate needs of business.[98]
{58} Not surprisingly, the ranks of the "privacy peacemakers" are made up largely of representatives of the
Internet industry and politicians, whose job is to balance the demands of competing constituencies. As a
result, the "privacy peacemaker" camp is far more numerous and better funded than either the dossier society
pessimists (who tend to be academics or public interest privacy advocates) or the market optimists (who are
almost exclusively academics).
2. "Privacy peacemaker" thinking in public policy initiatives
{59} Policy initiatives reflecting the peacemaker orientation would be expected to focus on scandalous and
controversial forms of privacy abuse that might impact public trust in the Internet or prompt legislative
overreaction. Regulation would focus on sensitive financial or medical information, information related to
gender, children, or personal safety. Identity theft and child stalking would be at the top of the list, regardless
of their actual prevalence in the society. One would expect to see little or no protection of neutral
biographical data (other than that useful for committing identity theft) or information related to consumer
preferences and lifestyle, regardless of whether that information might have commercial value.[99]
{60} Second, one would expect "privacy peacemaker" regulation to focus on protection where it is most
visible, and therefore reassuring. The most visible portion of the personal information spectrum is the nexus
where information is gathered from or provided to the individual consumers. One would expect to see few or
no restrictions imposed on the use of data outside public view.
{61} Finally, one might expect to see a higher level of protection being made available to the committed,
vocal and technologically savvy minority of citizens who are well informed about online privacy issues and
know how to protect their rights.[100] Provisions allowing consumers to "opt out" of certain uses of their
personal information may respond to the goals of "privacy peacemakers", in that they provide a safety valve
for the concerned minority who might protest if no such outlet were provided. One would not expect "privacy
peacemaker" proposals to contain inalienability provisions or other limitations on the use of data for its own
sake, nor would one expect to see proposals to vest individuals with anything like a property right in their
personal information. 
  
  
V. Who Leads at Halftime?: Current Privacy Initiatives in the United States
{62} The game of defining and regulating online privacy rights is far from over. At most, it is halftime, with
the final score unknown. Still, trends have emerged which lead one to conclude that the "privacy
peacemaker" camp clearly holds the halftime lead, dominating the debate in most arenas and having the
largest influence on policy proposals. Dossier society pessimist and market opportunist concerns are
marginalized, appearing only inferentially in policy proposals. This paper concludes by reviewing current
policy proposals in two areas: (1) "fair information handling practices," which form the basis for online
privacy proposals by the Clinton administration, and (2) the Federal Trade Commission's legislative proposal
for regulating online privacy.
A. Fair information handling practices and the Clinton Administration
{63} Various entities have compiled lists of fair information handling practices for their own internal use, in
an effort to influence public policy or to encourage voluntary adherence by others. In 1972, the Department of
Health Education and Welfare ("HEW") established a federal advisory committee which reviewed the
handling of information at the federal agency level and promulgated a series of "fair information practices,"
which have been cited and built upon by numerous other entities since that time.[101] In 1980, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") issued its own guidelines for handling
personal data.[102] The Council of Europe adopted a Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1985.[103] A 1995 report by the Privacy Policy Working
Group of the United States Government's Information Infrastructure Task Force [104] also included fair
information handling principles. In 1995, the European Commission issued its Privacy Directive, setting out
the rights of data subjects and the responsibilities of data processors.[105] Each of these documents was built
upon the concept of defining fair information handling practices.
{64} On July 1, 1997, the Clinton White House released the Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,
[106] a general policy statement setting out the administration's philosophy regarding the relationship
between government and the world of electronic commerce. The portion of that document addressing online
privacy endorsed general privacy principles articulated in several prior policy statements, including the 1995
report by the IITF Task Force.[107]
{65} More recently, a 1998 paper by the Department of Commerce ("DOC") entitled, "Elements of Effective
Self-Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and Questions Related to Online Privacy" listed nine privacy
principles[108] regarded as typical fair information handling guidelines:
1. "Awareness": Disclosure of the identity of the data collecting party and means for
avoiding participating in such transactions;
2. "Choice": A mechanism to exercise options, including "affirmative choice" for
certain "sensitive" categories of information relating to, for example, medical
conditions, or children;
3. "Data security": Protections against improper alteration or misappropriation of
data;
4. "Data integrity": Keeping data which is accurate and relevant for the purposes for
which it was collected;
5. "Consumer access": The ability of consumers to review and correct data about
themselves, although the document warns that the extent of access may vary by
industry, due to the costs involved; and
6. "Accountability": Companies should be accountable in some manner for
compliance with their own policies.
In addition, the Principles include three "enforcement principles":
1. "Consumer recourse": A way to resolve disputes that is "readily available and
affordable";
2. "Verification": A third-party check on compliance; and
3. "Consequences": Sanctions for failure to comply.
{66} Several areas of dispute exist with respect to the interpretation and adequacy of these types of fair
information handling practices. With respect to "awareness" (sometimes also called "notice"), it may be
questioned whether posting a privacy notice on a webpage really provides notice to more than a small
handful of users who actually bother to access the posted policy and read it. The fact that only a small
minority of users will access such policy statements indicates that the peacemaker function of such notices
provides protection only for the vocal and informed few, but not the mass of Internet users.
{67} The principle of "choice" (or "consent") implicates the selection of default rules discussed above, and
whether affirmative consent ("opt in") must be obtained before a website sponsor can use information
gathered in one transaction for other purposes or transfer it to third parties.[109] Statements of fair
information handling practices usually assume that "opt out" rules are generally adequate.[110] The highest
level of protection offered generally consists of an affirmative "opt in" requirement for some kinds of
sensitive information or classes of vulnerable persons.[111] The "opt out" nature of consent in most fair
information handling guidelines gives them a decidedly peacemaker bent. They do little to force, or to even
encourage, transactions in personal data.
{68} Controversy also exists regarding the extent to which consumers are entitled to see the information kept
about them, and on what terms access will be provided.[112] This debate highlights the fact that fair handling
practices guidelines do not recognize a property right in the data subject; the data is presumed to be owned by
the data collector and, as a result, the data subject's right to access must be balanced against considerations of
cost and convenience to the data appropriator.
{69} Some fair information practices guidelines stress that only "relevant" information should be gathered,
and that once the purpose of the information has been fulfilled, it should be destroyed.[113] These sorts of
limitations, unenforceable as they may be, reflect the concerns of the dossier society pessimists in limiting the
existence of information dossiers in general, separate and apart from any particular showing of abuse or
harm. However, such guidelines generally shrink from imposing concrete limitations that are capable of
enforcement.[114]
{70} Finally, disputes exist over the concept of enforcement and accountability,[115] which revolve around
the extent to which commercial entities (or their trade organizations) should be allowed to police themselves,
or whether an external audit and disciplinary function is necessary. Proposals range from the relatively
toothless[116] to the full panoply of administrative sanctions and private rights of action, including
provisions for attorneys' fees and punitive damages.[117]
{71} In addition, fair information handling guidelines directed specifically at the online environment
generally fall into the peacemaker camp in that they tend to address rights only for information collected
from the subject online. Notice, access and other similar rights apply to information gathered directly from
the individual, not to all information collected by the entity from third parties, nor do such guidelines contain
inalienability rules.[118]
{72} The current negotiations between the United States and the European Union ("EU") over the 1995
Privacy Directive ("Directive") concern the issues cited above. The Directive is perceived to be substantially
more protective of privacy than the current American regulatory scheme for various reasons. First, the
Directive contemplates the establishment of national privacy regulators in each EU member state,[119]
something unknown in the United States. Moreover, the Directive establishes and requires adoption of a
nationwide privacy law in each member state, governing all processing of personal data, whether by
computer or manually, and applying across the board to all industry segments and transactions.[120] The
Directive is not limited to the regulation of handling information obtained at the data gathering stage, nor to
that obtained through a particular medium. The Directive applies to all processing of data, regardless of how
that data came into the hands of the processor,[121] and it contains an expanded list of subjects deemed to be
sensitive, as to which special restrictions on use and transfer apply.[122]
{73} Nevertheless, the Directive is built around a list of rights of data subjects,[123] and duties of data
processors,[124] that track, in broad brush, the same fair information handling practices principles described
above.[125] In that regard, while the Directive contemplates a greater government role in privacy regulation,
it must still be considered fundamentally a "privacy peacemaker" regulation.
{74} The fundamental similarity between the goals of privacy regulation in the United States and the EU can
be seen in the dramatic narrowing of the debate between the two sides in recent months. Because the
Directive provides that data may not be exported from the EU to any country that does not provide roughly
equivalent privacy protection,[126] the threat that data flows from the EU to the U.S. will be cut off has
prompted extensive negotiations between Clinton administration officials and EU privacy negotiators.[127]
The United States' position in those negotiations has been to urge that self-regulatory measures by industry
trade associations can constitute adequate protection to qualify members of those associations to receive data
flows from entities in the EU.[128] At last report, the U.S. negotiators maintained that the two sides were
close to reaching an agreement.[129]
B. Legislation
{75} A review of Internet-related privacy legislation proposed by the FTC confirms the impression discussed
above. The public policy debate is taking place largely within the privacy peacemaker model, and is not
directed toward substantially curtailing the use of personal information dossiers in business, nor is it intended
to encourage the development of markets in such information. Leaving aside statutes prohibiting interception
of electronic communications, the principle statute aimed at online privacy at the federal level to date is the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.[130] As of the date of this article, no general Internet privacy
legislation has been passed.[131]
{76} In the summer of 1998, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") reported to Congress that the vast
majority of websites collect personal data of some sort from site visitors, but that very few of them even post
a privacy policy, considered the bare minimum of privacy protection to most.[132] FTC Chairman, Robert
Pitofsky testified before Congress in July 1998, that the failure of the business community to implement a
system of self-regulation for online privacy prompted the agency to recommend federal legislation for online
privacy protection.[133] In that testimony, the FTC chairman outlined the Commission's vision of what
Internet privacy regulation should look like.[134] That vision is, fundamentally, a peacemaker model.
{77} The FTC-proposed legislation setting forth four basic privacy principles, adopted from various existing
fair information handling practices guidelines. Those principles would include (1) "Notice/awareness"; (2)
"Choice/consent"; (3) "Access/participation" (the right to obtain access to and correct personal data); and (4)
"Security/Integrity".[135] A regulatory agency (presumably, the FTC) would then be given the responsibility
to issue more detailed regulations enforcing these basic principles. Self-regulation would still be encouraged,
however, as a preferred solution. The agency would be authorized to approve industry self-regulatory
schemes, and once approved, participation in such schemes would serve as a safe harbor from further federal
regulation and enforcement.[136]
{78} Evaluation of such a scheme is difficult in the abstract because so much would depend on the specific
regulations adopted by the agency. Noticeably absent from the FTC's proposed basic principles; however, is
any language fundamentally limiting the current business practice of gathering extensive amounts of personal
information or indicating that significant aspects of such use should be curtailed on grounds the dossier
society pessimists would recognize. The statutory scheme outlined by the FTC would not appear to authorize
the agency to recognize property rights in personal information on behalf of data subjects, nor impose
transaction forcing measures for the sake of spurring a market in such information. 
  
 
VI. Conclusion
{79} Most discussions of online privacy policy focus on the tools of privacy protection -- the choice between
government regulation, industry self-regulation, or laissez faire market discipline. At the same time, however,
a number of diverse commentators are raising fundamental questions about what society ultimately hopes to
accomplish in regulating online privacy. Some raise questions about whether cyberspace is the place to draw
a line in the sand in the battle against the emerging dossier society. Others seek to take advantage of the
unique features of the Internet to promote a market in personal information which, if successful, would
constitute a significant transfer of wealth to the middle class, whose personal data is highly valued by
business. The viewpoints of those authors have not featured prominently in the privacy proposals debated in
Washington, D.C. Many new proposals for privacy regulation are bound to be introduced in the regulatory
and legislative sphere over the upcoming year. The intent of this article has been to assist observers of the
ongoing privacy debate in evaluating policy proposals more critically, in terms of what goals they promote,
and what assumptions they embody, as well as what regulatory tools they seek to employ. 
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following the publication by a Washington magazine of the video titles that Robert Bork, then a federal
appellate judge and a nominee for the United States Supreme Court, had rented.
[44] "The standards in place for fair information practices depend entirely on the context. In one context,
such as direct marketing, personal information may have only limited protection against unfair use. In
another context, such as employee recordkeeping, the same personal information may be subject to stringent
legal and business controls." Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 12, at 12 (presenting a thorough discussion
of privacy legislation not limited to the online context). See Madsen, supra note 12, Chapter 4 (describing the
evolution of federal privacy legislation). For a helpful chart of federal privacy statutes, see Patricia Mell,
Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1 (1996).
[45]See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2710-11 (1999) (preventing videotape
rental companies from disclosing personal information regarding tape rentals).
[46]See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. Section 1232g (1999) (limiting
disclosure of student loan records to third parties without consent of the data subject).
[47]See Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2721-2725 (1999) (prohibiting state
governments from disclosing (i.e., selling) personal identifying information held in drivers license bureaus,
such as the driver's photograph, social security number, drivers license number, address, phone number, and
medical or disability information). The Act has been challenged on Tenth Amendment grounds in numerous
recent federal court cases. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
1753 (1999) (striking down the Act as a violation of the Tenth Amendment); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000
(7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Act); Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Circuit 1998)
(upholding the Act).
[48]See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections1681-1681t (1999). The Act limits disclosure of
consumer records and provides certain rights to inspect and correct, or at least supplement, erroneous credit
agency records.
[49]See The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. Section 552 (1999) (The Privacy Act was amended in 1994 to
limit the ability of federal agencies to make decisions about individual entitlements based solely on computer
matches.). Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a (1999) (The
amendment also imposed an obligation on agencies taking negative action based on a computer database
match to notify the affected individual and afford an opportunity to challenge the determination).
[50]See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 (1999) (explaining
that this Act requires that a government entity seeking information including subscriber information from an
Internet service provider obtain a subpoena and warrant or court order to obtain such information. It also
prohibits any "person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public" from disclosing
the contents of electronic communications such as e-mails).
[51]See In re GeoCities, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,624 (FTC 1988) (stating that the order recites that GeoCities failed
to abide by its published policy of not sharing personal data with third parties).
[52] My division of the privacy commentary into three schools of thought differs from the more common way
of categorizing the current privacy debate on a continuum where one pole is "market discipline" (i.e., laissez
faire), the other pole is "government regulation," and the middle ground is "self regulation" See, e.g., Peter
Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in
Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age 3 (1997). While this typology serves well to categorize
the tools available to regulate privacy, my interest here is focusing on the divergent goals that privacy
proponents seek to advance.
[53] The classic account is, of course, George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).
[54] Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 20 (1971).
[55]See, e.g., Big Corporations Can Have Their Own CIA, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1967, at 18. Thirty
years ago Alan Westin identified various factors related to the growth of the dossier society: The number of
public and private programs gathering data, personal mobility, the facility of gathering and manipulating data
through the digital computer, the ability of computers to share information through common computer
languages, and the advent of credit cards and other alternatives to cash. See Alan Westin, Privacy and
Freedom 160-63 (1967).
[56]See, e.g., William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (1956), Myron Brenton, The Privacy Invaders
(1964); Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967); Jerry Martin Rosenberg, The Death of Privacy (1969);
Arthur R. Miller, Assault on Privacy (1971).
[57] Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX.
L. REV. 837, 838 (1971). One author highlights the threat posed by the combination of relational databases
with point of sale ("POS") systems that gather data about individual purchases. Frequent shopper programs
allow any marketing firm, manufacturer, employer, private investigator or Federal agency to know who has
hemorrhoids, who reads supermarket tabloids, who eats chunky peanut butter, or who smokes cigarettes. .
.One could imagine a person losing medical or health insurance coverage because he or she happens to buy a
pack of cigarettes for a friend. Madsen, supra note 12, at 136.
[58] An example would be discrimination based on zip code as a proxy for racial discrimination. As the
demographic formulas used for marketing or other purposes become more and more complex, it becomes
increasingly difficult, bordering on the impossible, to probe behind the demographic formula to find the
suspect discriminatory core, however dossier society critics like Oscar Gandy suspect it lurks there. See
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77-79 (1996).
[59] "[M]y concern about the status of privacy in cyberspace is fundamentally a concern with
discrimination." Id. at 79. The management of relations between individuals and corporations is based on the
treatment of individuals as members of these constructed classes, rather than as unique and autonomous
individuals. . . "Rejection based on the performance of the group in the area, rather than individual
performance, is permitted within the bounds of the qualifications set forth." Id. at 130 (quoting Robert J.
Posch, Jr., The Complete Guide to Marketing and the Law 765 (Prentice Hall 1988)).
[60] For a philosophic discussion of the value of privacy see Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation,
(1992) (stating that privacy is desirable because it favors other goods such as self respect and the ability to
foster intimate relationships). A sociological discussion of the value and uses of privacy is contained in
Westin, Privacy and Freedom , supra, note 56. The arguments regarding uses of privacy are reviewed in
numerous law review articles as well. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 12.
[61]See, Kang, supra note 12, at 1260-61.
[62]See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
[63]See Kang, supra note 12, at 1260; Gavison, supra note 28, at 460; Foucault, supra note 62, at 35
(discussing the "chilling effect" of surveillance); Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon, A Philosophical
Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 Computer & High
Tech. L. J. 27, 28 n. 2 (1995) (discussing loss of privacy that will result from complete visibility of behavior
for drivers using an Intelligent Vehicle Highway System "IVHS").
[64]See Gandy, No End In Sight, supra note 59, at 123-25 (being watched, as by a peeping Tom, injures our
"moral ownership of ourself."); Kang, supra note 13, at 1063 (highlighting that Professor Kang poses a vivid
hypothetical example of a machine which would allow the remote sensation of touch without the subject
being aware of its use, and describes the sense of violation most people would feel in connection with the use
of such a machine). Id. at 1263.
[65]See Gandy, No End In Sight, supra note 59, at 123-25; Westin, supra note 55, at 24 (noting the universal
tendency of democratic societies to restrict surveillance by their governments).
[66]See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonimity and Limited
Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 139 (1996) (arguing that anonymous or pseudonymous
communication in cyberspace fulfills an important political role, but also acknowledging the possible benefits
of imposing a bonding requirement to protect against the harm that can be caused by such speech).
[67]See Gandy, No End In Sight supra note 54, at 123-25 (depicting that constant surveillance stunts the
maturity of citizens and injures them as individualists because persons always being monitored and
supervised never develop the capacity of self control and remain forever the moral equivalent of children);
Reiman, supra note 63 (discussing "total visibility infantilizes people. It impoverishes their inner life and
makes them more vulnerable to oppression from without." Reiman also makes the point that privacy and the
individualism it fosters are integral to a liberal conception of politics and society).
[68] Those concerns are reflected, for example, in the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, supra
note 49, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, supra note 48, both of which provide certain protections against
harm from inaccurate results of computer processed personal data.
[69]See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 57, at 869 (arguing that the only hope for substantial protection for
privacy against computerized dossiers is that they not be allowed to exist).
[70] Market language is also used in a related, though different, sense by some commentators and advocates.
See, e.g., President Willam J. Clinton, Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce, July 1, 1997, at 17 available at (visited May 15, 1999)
<http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.html/>. (stating that "disclosure [of privacy policies] by data
gatherers is designed to stimulate market resolution of privacy concerns by empowering individuals to obtain
relevant knowledge about why information is being collected, what the information will be used for. . .").
"Market resolution" in this sense means simply that consumers can avoid sites that make unwanted demands
on their privacy, not that a market in information will develop, which I have identified as the core of the
market opportunist position. Other sources discuss the likelihood that "market discipline" will punish sites or
institutions that the public associates with abusive privacy practices. It seems likely, however, that such
market discipline only will be brought to bear against egregious violators of community norms whose
activities take place in the visible portion of the privacy spectrum.
[71] Professor Noam discusses and rejects three arguments against developing markets in personal data. See
Noam, supra note 7, at 30-32. First, just because privacy may be a fundamental right does not mean
individuals should not be allowed to trade it, based on the value they perceive it to have for themselves.
Second, the fact that consumers have less knowledge of the value of the transaction than their commercial
counterparties, and therefore will be unable to trade effectively, underestimates the information leveling
effect of competition. Third, the argument that the poor will be forced to sell their privacy to make ends meet
ignores the equally unfortunate fact that personal information about the poor is of limited value to
commercial marketers. Id.
[72]See, e.g., Noam, supra note 7, at 22 ("[M]arkets can be utilized much more than in the past."); Laudon,
supra note 33, at 41; Hal Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in
the Information Age 35, 39 (1997). In addition, the following authors, while not necessarily advocating
government measures to promote trading markets in personal data, have analyzed privacy issues from a
market perspective. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Healthcare
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997); Peter P. Swire, Cyberbanking and Privacy: the Contracts Model,
(abstract of talk for Computers, Freedom & Privacy '97, San Francisco (March 1997)), available at (visited
May 30, 1999) <http://www.osu.edu/units/law.swire.htm>; Kang, supra note 13; Sharfman, supra note 6.
[73]See Noam, supra note 7, at n.33 (stating that consumer information business is a "multi-billion dollar a
year business, centered on credit bureaus. . . .").
[74]See Laudon, supra, note 32, at 41. As a further consequence [of lack of individual rights in personal data]
the price of personal information is so low that information-intense industries become inefficient in its use.
The price is low because the price of personal information does not reflect the true social costs of coping with
personal information. The market is dominated by privacy-invading institutions. As a result, there is a
disturbing growth in privacy invasion.
[75]See Swire, supra note 52, at 6.
The key market failures with respect to privacy concern information and bargaining
costs. The information costs arise because of the information asymmetry between
the company and the customer -- the company typically knows far more than the
customer about how the information will be used by the company. . .The costs of
learning about companies' policies are magnified by the difficulty customers face in
detecting whether companies in fact are complying with those policies. . . .The
problems are exacerbated by the costs of bargaining for the desired level of privacy.
. . To be successful, bargaining would likely require a considerable degree of
expertise in privacy issues, as well as a substantial commitment of time and effort.
The cost of this elaborate bargaining process is likely to exceed the incremental
benefit in privacy to that citizen.
[76]See Laudon, supra note 32, at 41. Under current law, the ownership right to personal information is given
to the collector of that information, and not to the individual to whom the information refers. Individuals have
no property rights in their own personal information. As a result, they cannot participate in the flourishing
market for personal information . . . .
[77]Id.
[78]See id. at 43.
[79]See Sharfman, supra note 6, at 639 (1996) (favoring an online default rule under which website
promoters can obtain rights to information by publishing warnings noting that the environment is a
"disclosure environment" -- meaning that none of the activity online is private -- and an opportunity to opt
out. An opt in rule would be inefficient since data sources, like phone books, are only valuable if most people
participate. As a result, he opposes, on efficiency grounds, any rule that would create an incentive for people
to opt out.); Kang, supra note 13 (favoring a default rule under which data can only be used in connection
with the actual transaction for which it is gathered, absent consent; Professor Kang fears that the transaction
costs to consumers of learning about how to protect and buy back their privacy rights, plus the impossibility
of buying back all of them, will result in any other default rule giving individuals less than the optimum
amount of privacy over personal information).
[80]See Laudon, supra, note 32, at 42. Professor Laudon foresees establishment of a marketplace in which
individual ownership of personal information would be recognized, and individuals would have the right to
sell their information to information intermediaries on a "National Information Exchange." Id.
[81]See Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce: Personal Information is Like Gold in the Internet Economy, and
the Rush is on to both Exploit It and Protect It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at C4. This article also discusses
the advent of "Free PC," a company which offers to provide consumers with a free PC if they will agree to fill
out a detailed questionnaire regarding their personal characteristics and lifestyle, then submit to being
bombarded with marketing materials from advertisers. Id. The author credits the terms "infomediaries" to
John Hagel, author of Net Worth: Shaping Markets When Customers Make the Rules (1999).
[82]See Noam, supra, note 7, at 23 (citing data regarding willingness of telephone subscribers to pay
additional fee for unlisted numbers as proof that consumers are willing to pay for privacy at least under
certain circumstances).
[83]See id. at 28-29. Professor Noam notes that because the same personal information can be valuable to
multiple marketing entities the information may be sold more than once, making it more valuable to the
seller. As a result, it will be difficult for consumers to outbid those entities to "buy back" their privacy rights
at a reasonable price. "[F]or personal data banks containing information about individuals, market
transactions are unlikely when the information is of use to many others, or it will be acquired by them. In
either case the personal information, if valuable, becomes public information." Id.
[84]See Laudon, supra, note 32, at 43.
[85] Swire, supra note 52, at 6.
[86]See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Regulatory Models for Protecting Privacy in the Internet, in Privacy and Self
Regulation in the Information Age 107-09 (1997) (stating that property right in personal information would
be cumbersome and expensive to administer; enforcement would be a "nightmare"; the failure of some
subjects to part with their data would make personal information databases incomplete and therefore less
valuable for everyone; demands for compensation - even at small amounts per person - would be too
expensive and it would be difficult to deliver consideration in small increments).
[87]See Varian, supra note 72, at 40 (citing fears that government will assign ownership of personal data to
individuals in a manner that makes it difficult or impossible to sell it, thereby hampering development of a
market in such data.); Noam, supra note 7, at 26, 30-31 (stating that markets require a legal environment
which allows such transactions to be carried out; the author would limit government regulation to elimination
of high transaction costs which otherwise prevent a market in such information from developing).
[88]See Noam, supra note 7, at 26 (stating that one of the prerequisites for markets in personal information to
develop is "[s]ymmetry of information among the transacting parties.")
[89]See discussion supra note 79. Professor Kang analyzes alternative default rules in light of both market
and human dignity concerns and concludes that the rule he proposes meets the objectives of both sorts of
analyses. See Kang, supra, note 13.
[90]See Perritt, Jr., supra note 86, at 108.
[91]See Patricia Mell, supra note 43, at 78 (advocating statutory recognition of property rights in a "persona"
consisting of personal information about the individual); Laudon, supra, note 32, at 42 (discussing that "the
function of government here should be to restore power to one class of participants in the market, namely
individuals, by vesting ownership of personal information in the individual. The second function of
government is to ensure the orderly functioning of a personal information marketplace." Laudon suggests
recognition of a common law property right of an individual in his or her "data image", analogous to
photographic images of individuals which already receive protection at common law); Noam, supra, note 7,
at 26 (mentioning "[t]he ability to create property rights, or to exclude" as a prerequisite to the creation of a
market in personal data. This implies either government action to recognize and enforce such property rights,
or the development of technological means to exclude others regardless of the state of the law).
[92] Some have taken the position that the entire superstructure of contracting, enforcement, and payment of
consideration may simply be too complicated and expensive to be practical, even given the efficiencies of the
Internet. See e.g., Perritt, supra note 86, at 108.
[93]See Swire, supra note 52 at 5-6 (stating that one of the difficulties in establishing markets for privacy is
the difficulty individual consumers would have in policing the behavior of online partners).
[94]See, e.g., Clinton & Gore, supra note 70, at 16 ("commerce on the GII [Global Information
Infrastructure] will thrive only if the privacy rights of individuals are balanced with the benefits associated
with the free flow of information"); Privacy Online, supra note 5, at 4. (Public opinion poll findings "suggest
that consumers will continue to distrust online companies and will remain wary of engaging in electronic
commerce until meaningful and effective consumer privacy protections are implemented in the online
marketplace. If such protections are not implemented, the online marketplace will fail to reach its full
potential").
[95]See Peter Swire, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European
Privacy Directive (1998). In Chapter 4, Professor Swire weighs the arguments that privacy regulation will
hinder or promote the development of ecommerce, and concludes that certain modest and focused regulatory
efforts, or measures to define rights in personal data, may foster consumer confidence and hence boost
ecommerce, but that sweeping information rights schemes will probably hinder it. Id. at 76-89; see also
Blumenfeld, supra note 23, at 349-50 (The potential of the Internet to become a "virtual business market
without walls" will be "stifled if those running the shops do not address consumer's privacy concerns").
[96]See supra note 1.
[97]See Blumenfeld, supra note 23, at 382 (urging business to engage in self regulation so government will
not "step in and fill the void").
[98]See Clinton & Gore, supra note 70, at 16 (referring to "balancing" privacy rights against "the benefits
associated with the free flow of information"); Privacy and the NII, supra note 13, at 3 ("[P]rivacy interests
are not absolute and must be balanced against the need for accountability, since the unabridged flow of
information."); Irene Hashfield and Sara Fitzgerald, The Role of Consumer Education in a Self Regulatory
Privacy Regime, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age 155, 157 (1997) ("Effective ways of
addressing [privacy] concerns are complicated by a number of factors, including: . . . the need to balance the
protection of legitimate personal privacy rights with legitimate commercial activities. . .").
[99]See Swire, supra, note 52, at 83 ("Privacy laws are likely to be significantly less important for bolstering
consumer confidence if the security risk, and the accompanying risk of direct financial loss, is understood to
be small").
[100]See Sharfman, supra note 6 (Most persons do not care about disclosure of online activity based, for
example, on limited use of anonymous remailers; as a result, all that fairness and efficiency require is that the
users that do care be given an opportunity to "opt out").
[101] The HEW Advisory Comm. Report included five privacy principles, referred to as the "Code of Fair
Information Practices":
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose very existence is
secret.
2. There must be a way for individuals to find out what information about them is in
a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for individuals to prevent information about them obtained
for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without their
consent.
4. There must be a way for individuals to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about them.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use
and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of data.
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare, Pub. No. (OS) 73-94, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens 41 (1973).
[102]See OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980).
The Guidelines establish eight privacy principles: (1) collection limitation principle (data to be
collected lawfully and "where appropriate" with the subjects consent; (2) data quality principle
(data to be kept accurate); (3) purpose specification principle (purpose of collection to be
specified); (4) use limitation principle (no disclosure for other purposes without consent); (5)
security safeguards principle (security of data), (6) openness principle (ability to establish the
identity of the data controller); (7) individual participation principle (data subjects right of
access); and (8) accountability (enforcement and sanctions).
See id. at para. 7-14.
[103]See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
Council of Europe European Treaty Series No. 108, Oct. 1, 1985. This convention includes principles similar
to the OECD guidelines.
[104]See Privacy and the NII, supra note 10. That report, in turn, built on the work already done by other
entities including the OECD.
[105]See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 24, 1995, on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data an on the free movement of such data.
Official Journal No. L 281, 23/11/1995 p.003.
[106]See Clinton & Gore, supra note 70. The document was generated by a task force headed by Ira C.
Magaziner, Senior Advisor to the President for Policy Development. The Information Infrastructure Task
Force is an interdepartmental task force established by the Clinton Admin. and chaired by the Sec. of
Commerce to address issues related to the "National Information Infrastructure." The final draft of the report
was issued by the Task Force on Jan. 17, 1997, and the document was issued by the White House under the
names of President Clinton and Vice President Gore on July 1, 1997. Information regarding organization of
the IITF can be obtained at the IITF web- page, available at (visited on May 15, 1999)
<http://www.iitf.nist.gov/index.html>.
[107] According to the Framework, the two main principles for fair information practices are "awareness"
and "choice" -"data gatherers should inform consumers what information they are collecting and how they
intend to use such data, and [d]ata-gatherers should provide consumers with a meaningful way to limit use
and re-use of personal information." Clinton & Gore, supra note 70, at 17.
[108]See Dept. of Commerce, Elements of Effective Self Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and
Questions Related to Online Privacy, No. 980422102-8102-01, available at
<http://www.ntia.doc/ntiahome/privacy/6_5_98fedreg.htm>.
[109]See supra note 79.
[110] The fair information practices handling guidelines discussed previously, generally assume that "opt out"
rules are adequate except for certain categories of sensitive data. The OECD Guidelines state that "Personal
Data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified. . .
except with the consent of the data subject . . ." except for those purposes disclosed at the time the
information was gathered or other "not incompatible" uses which are "specified on each occasion of change
of purpose." OECD, supra note 102 at para.. 10, "Use Limitation Principle," and para. 9, "Purpose
Specification Principle." This appears to allow a data appropriator to use data for new purposes upon giving
subsequent notice without giving the subject the ability to opt out. The Privacy Working Group Guidelines
state, "If an information user seeks to use personal information in an incompatible manner (compared with
the understanding of the data subject at the time the information was obtained regarding the uses that would
be made of the information), the user must first notify the individual and obtain his or her consent." Privacy
and the NII, supra note 6, at para. 22. However they also provide that "opt out" consent may be sufficient,
depending on the significance of the information and its use to the individual. The individual's understanding
is principally a matter of the notice given when the information was first obtained. Id. The Elements of
Effective Self-Regulation created by the Dept. of Commerce clearly contemplate "opt out" consent for non-
sensitive information. See Elements of Effective Self Reputation, supra note 108, at para. A2.
[111] The Council of Europe Convention states, "Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or
religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed
automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data
relating to criminal convictions." Council of Europe, supra note 102, at Art. 6. The Elements of Effective Self
Regulation, state that, "for certain kinds of information, e.g., medical information or information related to
children, affirmative choice by consumers may be appropriate. In these cases companies should not use
personal information unless its use is explicitly consented to by the individual, or in the case of children, his
parent or guardian." Elements of Effective Self Regulation, supra note 108 at para. A2.
[112] The OECD Guidelines state that a "not excessive" charge may be assessed as a condition for obtaining
access to one's data. See OECD, supra note 102, at para 13. The Council of Europe Convention, Art. 8.b,
refers to obtaining access without "excessive delay or expense." Council of Europe, supra note 103.
[113] The OECD Guidelines state that only relevant information should be gathered. See OECD, supra note
102, at para. 10. The Privacy Working Group guidelines, state that "In all cases, the information user should
only acquire that information reasonably expected to support those activities." Privacy and the NII, supra
note 6 at para. 9. The Council of Europe Convention, states that data should be "adequate, relevant, and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored." Council of Europe, supra note 103, at Art. 5.
[114] The Privacy Working Group guidelines start out sounding highly protective. They state: "Although
information storage costs decrease continually, it is inappropriate to collect volumes of personal information
simply because some of the information may, in the future, prove to be so some unanticipated value."
However the exception that follows swallows the rule: "Also, personal information that has served its
purpose and is no longer reasonably expected to support any current or planned activities should not be
kept." Privacy and the NII, supra note 6. This vague standard not likely to impose any significant obligation
to prune databases of unneeded information.
[115] The OECD Guidelines, state simply that the data controller "shall be accountable." OECD supra note
102, at para. 14. The Privacy Working Group guidelines, state only that "work needs to be done" to find
verification mechanisms that are not too expensive to business. See Privacy and the NII, supra note 10, at
para. B2.
[116] The Privacy Working Group guidelines do not mention civil litigation or criminal sanctions, but such
omissions may be understandable given that the guidelines' focus is on self-regulation. Instead the guidelines
mention "cancellation of the right to use a certifying seal or logo, posting the name of the non-complier on a
'bad actor' list, or disqualification from membership in an industry trade association." Privacy and the NII,
supra note 10, at para. B3. The guidelines also state that non-compliers should pay the costs of assessing their
own noncompliance, and that FTC or other regulatory involvement may be appropriate when companies fail
to comply with their own posted policies. Id. A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce states simply
that "Consumers are entitled to redress if they are harmed by improper use or disclosure of personal
information or if decisions are based on inaccurate, outdated, incomplete, or irrelevant personal information."
Clinton & Gore, supra note 70 at 17.
[117] The OECD Guidelines state that member states should endeavor to encourage self regulation and
"provide for adequate sanctions and remedies in case of failures to comply with measures which implement
the principles." OECD, supra note 102 at para. 19(d). The Privacy Working Group guidelines are more
explicit as to options for redress, stating that "When redress is appropriate, the Principles envision various
forms including, but not limited to, informal complaint resolution, mediation, arbitration, civil litigation,
regulatory enforcement, and criminal prosecution, in various private, local, state, and federal forums with the
goal of providing relief in the most cost-effective manner possible." Privacy and the NII, supra note 10, at
para. 34.
[118] The OECD and Council of Europe guidelines and the EU Directive are not limited to the online
environment, nor are they limited to data collected directly from the individual data subject. See OECD,
supra note 102, at para. 2; Council of Europe, supra note 103, at Art. 3 (scope of the Convention is
"automated personal data files and automatic processing of personal data."). See also, Directive, supra note
105, discussed at nn.120-127, infra. The guidelines of the Privacy Working Group specifically limit notice
obligations to situations where data is gathered directly from the data subject. See Privacy and the NII, supra
note 10, at II.B para. 1.
Personal information can be collected ... directly from the individual or obtained from some
secondary sources. By necessity, the principles governing these two methods of acquiring
information differ. While notice obligations can be placed on all those who collect information
directly from the individual, they cannot be imposed uniformly on entities that have no such
direct relationship.
[119] The Directive provides, "Each member state shall provide that one or more public authorities are
responsible for the application within its territory of the provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to
this directive. These authorities shall act with complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to
them." Directive, supra note 105, at Art. 29 para. 1. Earlier proposals made in connection with adoption of
the Privacy Act of 1974, see supra note 49, included provision for a privacy commission to govern privacy
issues within the federal government, but that proposal was watered down until the final bill included only
provision for a privacy commission which would prepare a report on privacy issues and then disband. The
report, when it finally was issued in 1977, contained a recommendation that a permanent privacy commission
be established. See Madsen, supra note 12 at 140-41 (discussing various legislative proposals for
establishment of a federal privacy commission in the 1980s). That recommendation has never been acted on.
[120] The Directive provides that each member state is to adopt and apply its own national law consistent
with the Directive. See id. at Article 4. For a thorough discussion of the Directive and its practical impact on
United States concerns, see Peter Swire, None of Your Business, World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce
and the European Privacy Directive (1998).
[121] The definition of "processing" in the Directive is very sweeping. "[P]rocessing personal data ... shall
mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
blocking, erasure or destruction." Directive, supra note 105, at Article 2 para. (b).
[122] Member states are required to "prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data
concerning health or sex life." Id. at Article 8, para. 1.
[123] The Directive lists five "principles relating to data quality," including the principle that data must be
collected fairly and lawfully, that data be collected for specific legitimate purposes and not "processed" in a
way incompatible with those purposes, that data not be kept which are "excessive" in relation to the purpose
for which they were collected, and that data be kept in personally identifiable form only so long as necessary.
Id. at Article 6. Pursuant to the Directive, "Information providers should therefore not sell the personal data
of their customers without their consent." See Dr. Herbert Burkert, Addressing the Issue of Privacy in a
European Regulatory Environment, Presentation at the Information Superhighway Asia I, in Singapore, Sept.
5, 1996, available at (visited October 24, 1998)
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/<http://www.gmd.de/People/Herbert.Burkert/singap02.html> (Dr.
Herbert is described as Senior Advisor, BMD German National research Center for Information Technology
and Chairman of the Legal Advisory Board for the Information Market, European Commission.).
[124] "Criteria for making data processing legitimate" are listed separately, including the requirement that
"the data subject has unambiguously given his consent", however exceptions exist which undercut the
consent principle, including the provision allowing processing of data "necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties who whom the data are
disclosed." Id. at Art. 7.
[125]Id.
[126] The purpose of the Directive is to harmonize privacy policy in the EU to the extent that data flows can
be allowed to take place freely among EU member states without the concern that exportation of data from
one member state to another will diminish the protections that would otherwise be applicable to that data. See
Directive, supra note 98, at Art.1 para. 2. With respect to non EU countries, however, the Directive provides
that personal data transfers may only take place "if ... the third country in question ensures an adequate level
of protection." Id. at Art. 25 para. 1. See also, Fred H . Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information
Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995) (discussing limitations on data flows to United
States business if the Directive is enforced).
[127] While the government representatives negotiate, business groups have taken the lead in trying to find a
way to comply with the EU Directive sufficient to allow data flows to continue. Many of those ideas involve
voluntary commitments, through contract with EU-based data sources or commitments directly with the EU
itself, to abide by the EU standard. See, e.g., The International Chamber of Commerce, Working Party on
Privacy and Data Protection of the Commission on Telecommunications and Information Technologies.
(discussing model clauses prepared by the IIC that can be incorporated in contracts between U.S. recipients
of data and companies in the EU desiring to transmit such personal data abroad. Such clauses essentially
authorize the data exporter to enforce EU privacy standards against the data importer, and make the exporter
the proxy for the importer in defending against charges of data misuse brought in the EU as a result of the
importer's conduct).
[128] On Nov. 4, 1998, the Department of Commerce issued a letter headed, "Dear Industry Representative"
setting forth the United States' position that self regulatory measures adopted by industry trade organizations
should constitute a "safe harbor" disciplinary action or a cutoff of data flows from the European Union. The
text of the Department of Commerce letter on "Safe Harbor" is available at
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/menu.htm>. See also the EPIC Policy Alert for Nov. 10, 1998 available at
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/<http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_5.16.html>.
[129] Ambassador David L. Aaron, Undersecretary for International Trade, is leading the United States
negotiating team with respect to issues related to the Directive. He issued a letter to "Dear Colleagues" on
April 19, 1999, reporting on the status of the negotiations. In that letter he concluded that "the two sides have
achieved a substantial level of consensus on the content of the principles, on the content of more specific
guidance (frequently asked questions), and on the safe harbor procedures and benefits." Letter from
Ambassador Aaron, April 19, 1999 available at <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/aaron419.html>. The main
points of disagreement are reported to be (1) rights of access to data by data subjects (the United States
holding out for more limited access rights in the interest of avoiding expense to industry) and enforcement
(again, the United States favoring self enforcement by industry associations). See James Glave, US, EU Still
Stuck on Privacy, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 21, 1999, 3:00 A.M. P.D.T.
[130]See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. Section 6501 (1998). The Act prohibits
solicitation of information from children younger than thirteen without the affirmative consent of their
parents.
[131] To monitor the status of legislation affecting online privacy issues, visit the website of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, available at <http://www.epic.org/>.
[132]See Privacy Online, supra note 5.
[133]See Consumer Privacy on the World Wide Web, supra note 1.
[134]See id. at n. 23.
Currently the Commission has limited authority to prevent abusive practices in this area. The
Federal Trade Commission Act (the "FTC Act") grants the Commission authority to seek relief
for violations of the Act's prohibitions on unfair and deceptive practices in and affecting
commerce, an authority limited in this context to ensuring that Web sites follow their stated
information practices.
[135]Id. at 5-6. The meaning of these basic principles is further discussed in Privacy Online, supra note 5, at
7.
[136]See id. at 6-7.
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